RWANDAN JUSTICE AND THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT

Madeline H. Morris*
A complex and important feature of the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda is its concurrent jurisdiction with national courts. In
order to provide a context for discussion of this concurrent jurisdiction, I
will begin with a brief update on the national justice picture in Rwanda. I
will then consider the relationship between Rwandan national justice and
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) with an eye to the
implications of that ICTR experience for a future permanent International
Criminal Court.
Two years ago, in late 1996, the Rwandan parliament passed an
"organic" law to govern the handling of the criminal cases arising from the
Rwandan genocide. I worked closely with the Rwandan government in
designing that law. The organic law consists, essentially, of a confession
and guilty plea program that provides very substantial sentence reductions
in return for confessions and guilty pleas. This plea bargain arrangement
is made available to all perpetrators except the very most culpable
category, such as the leaders of the genocide. Those most culpable few are
subject to the regular Rwandan Penal Code procedures and penalties. The
confession and guilty plea program was intended as a compromise that
avoided a complete amnesty on the one hand and averted the need for tens
of thousands of full-blown trials on the other. That compromise, it was
hoped, also would contribute to national reconciliation.
Unfortunately, political obstacles have prevented the effective
implementation of the Organic Law. To date, almost four years after the
genocide and two full years after passage of the Organic Law, fewer than
ten thousand guilty pleas have been received and only 330 verdicts have
been rendered by Rwandan Courts-while 135,000 prisoners are being held
on suspicion of genocide-related crimes. The reasons for this impasse are
largely political. Just as one would expect, Rwandan politics have been
very factionalized on the issue of justice. While there are those within the
government who are of good will on the issue, there are also those who do
not wish to see justice processes go forward either because they sympathize
with the perpetrators on the one hand or, on the other extreme, because
they would rather see the prisoners continue to languish in prison. The
practical manifestation of the political resistance to justice processes has
come in two forms of inaction: first, failure to provide the information and
other forms of assistance that prisoners would need in order actually to
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enter a guilty plea under the Organic Law; and second, failure on the part
of prosecutors and judges to prepare the files and take the other steps
necessary to move the cases.
In 1996, there was a moment of opportunity. At that time it looked as
though there was some chance of a positive outcome on the national justice
front in Rwanda.
That opportunity has largely passed.
Political
obstructionism has, in large part, prevailed. Events in the former Zaire
surely have contributed to this outcome - the security threat and war there
strengthened the hand of hardliners on both sides as well as diverting
resources and attention away from domestic matters.
Now, in very recent developments, there is the prospect that a large
number, perhaps as many as 30,000 prisoners, for whom there are no files
or empty files, will be released for lack of evidence. This is a positive
development under the circumstances. There is also renewed discussion in
Rwanda of utilizing a revised version of the traditional justice mechanism,
called "Gacaca," in dealing with the getiocide cases. I will not take the
time here to go into that matter, except to flag one issue. The Gacaca
traditionally was comprised of the "wise men" of the village who would
come together to adjudicate disputes. It has been reported that, under the
revised version of a Gacaca now being discussed, the members of each
Gacaca would be appointed by a local governmental official who, in turn,
is appointed by the central government. The use of a body constituted in
that way to adjudicate genocide-related cases clearly could result in a
complete circumvention of the judiciary with whatever judicial
independence it might have. Persons who wish to bolster respect for the
rule of law should have serious questions about going in this direction. We
will need to look very carefully at the Gacaca initiative as it develops.
I hope that this update is useful and provides some context for us to
now turn our attention to the ICTR and, in particular, its interrelationship
with national justice in Rwanda.
The ICTR recently issued its first two opinions. In each of those
opinions, reference is made at various points to Rwandan national law. In
almost every such reference the ICTR gets Rwandan law wrong. And
these inaccuracies are not trivial. For instance, in its Kambanda decision,
the ICTR states, "Rwanda, like all States that have incorporated crimes
against humanity or genocide in their domestic legislation, has envisaged
the most severe penalties in the criminal legislation for those crimes." In
fact, Rwanda, has never enacted criminal legislation for genocide. While it
has ratified the genocide convention, Rwanda never enacted implementing
legislation. For that reason, when drafting the Organic Law to govern the
genocide-related cases, we had to carefully avoid retroactivity and apply
the regular Penal Code offense elements and penalties to the crimes
committed.
Also, in the Kambanda decision, the ICTR actually misquotes the
Rwandan Organic Law provision that defines "Category One" as the most
culpable category of perpetrators who will be subject to the death penalty.
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The ICTR states that Category One perpetrators include those who,
"committed acts of sexual violence." But that is not how the Organic Law
reads. Rather, it reads: those who, "committed acts of sexual torture."
The difference is very significant under Rwandan law.
"Torture,"
committed in the course of another crime, gives rise to the death penalty
under the Rwandan Penal Code; "violence" does not. Since Category One
defendants are subject to the death penalty, the Organic Law would enact a
retroactive increase in penalties if it read "sexual violence" rather than
"sexual torture."
Perhaps most egregious, the ICTR, still in Kambanda, claims that
"According to the list drawn up by the Attorney General of Rwanda...
Kambanda figures in Category One." But the "list" in question, drawn up
pursuant to the Organic Law, is a list of persons suspected of Category
One offenses. To use that list as a legal finding that someone is a Category
One perpetrator flagrantly violates the presumption of innocence and the
core of due process of law. Here, the ICTR both misstates Rwandan law
and, in an effort to apply Rwandan law, overlooks the most basic principles
of due process. I could go on with further examples of ICTR error on
Rwandan law but I will allow these few illustrations to suffice.
We can respond in one of two ways to the International Tribunal doing
poorly in its rendition of national law. One response would be to require
the International Tribunal to do better. An international court should be
able to accomplish this task, even while it may have some difficulty in light
of the paucity of materials on Rwandan law and the paucity of lawyers,
especially after the genocide in Rwanda. The second response that we
might have to the International Tribunal's poor performance on national
law would be to say that an International Tribunal should, as much as
possible, stick to international law, resorting to national law only when
truly necessary. This would seem like a wise practice both because of the
demonstrated perils of international courts applying bodies of national law
with which they are unfamiliar, and also because this would promote the
uniform development of international law. Where there are gaps in
international law, these will need to be filled. In the short run, it might
seem fair to defendants to fill those gaps with national law from their own
countries. But this would either result in indefinite non-uniformity as
different national laws are applied in different international cases or would
result in an arbitrary international adoption of the national law that
happened to have applied to the first international case where the issue
arose. Given those problems, together with the inherent difficulties of
international courts applying national law, it would seem preferable to have
international courts do so as rarely as possible.
The Rome Treaty for a permanent International Criminal Court or
"ICC" gets this issue about right, I believe. It provides that the law
applicable by the ICC will include, first, international law from all relevant
sources and only "failing that, general principles of law derived by the
Court from national laws of legal systems of the world including, as
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appropriate, the national laws of states that would normally exercise
jurisdiction over the crime." We may hope that this approach will help to
avoid problems such as those of the ICTR that I have just discussed.
The other aspect of the relationship of the ICTR with Rwandan
national justice that I want to mention involves the distribution of
defendants between the national and international fora. I will touch on this
issue only very briefly here as I have written about it at some length
elsewhere.' The distribution of defendants between the ICTR and the
Rwandan national justice system is essentially controlled by the ICTR.
Under the ICTR Statute, the International Tribunal has "primacy,"
meaning it can take jurisdiction over any given defendant and require
national courts to relinquish jurisdiction. The ICTR has exercised its
primacy with a policy of "stratified concurrent jurisdiction," as I will call
it, in which the international tribunal seeks to try the leadership-level
stratum of defendants and leaves the followers to be tried in national
courts, if at all. This stratified concurrent jurisdiction approach predictably
gives rise to two sorts of problems.
First, stratified concurrent jurisdiction systematically produces
anomalous outcomes in the handling of more and less responsible
defendants. This is so because the leaders, by virtue of being tried in the
international forum, typically receive more favorable treatment than the
followers, who are tried in national courts. The advantages for defendants
of international prosecution include: absence of the death penalty
(applicable in many national courts); greater due process protections
(including appointed defense counsel) than many national fora offer; better
conditions of incarceration than those in some countries; and, not
infrequently in post-conflict contexts, greater assurance of impartiality than
national courts can provide. A policy of stratified concurrent jurisdiction
thus leads to "anomalies of inversion" in which these crucial advantages
flow to the leaders who are, by hypothesis, most responsible for the mass
crimes while the followers are subject to harsher treatment.
Such anomalies of inversion have been pronounced as the ICTR has
pursued its policy of stratified concurrent jurisdiction relative to Rwandan
national courts. In Rwanda, many defendants who were not high-level
leaders in the Rwandan genocide have been sentenced to death in national
courts (and some executed) after summary trials, sometimes without
defense counsel, while leaders of the genocide have received lighter
sentences after trials with full due process at the ICTR. Anomalous
outcomes of this type will predictably occur where an international forum
with primacy pursues a policy of stratified concurrent jurisdiction.
Stratified concurrent jurisdiction also tends to impede national plea
bargaining arrangements. National justice systems may see fit to grant
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defendants benefits (such as sentence reductions) in return for guilty pleas
or other cooperation. This may be done to facilitate investigations or to
expedite prosecution of a large volume of cases. While plea bargaining
may be an advantageous strategy, governments instituting such a system
must avoid the appearance of excessive leniency toward perpetrators. One
way to achieve the necessary balance is to offer such "bargains" to some or
all followers while punishing leaders to the full extent of the law. Herein
lies the second problem with stratified concurrent jurisdiction. If the
international forum takes jurisdiction over the leaders to be prosecuted,
then the national forum will lack leaders to prosecute. Indeed, far from
being able to show that at least the leaders are being "prosecuted to the full
extent of the law," the national government seeking to institute a plea
bargaining arrangement will have to acknowledge that the leaders are
receiving substantial advantages in the international forum. National
justice systems, consequently may be impeded in their plea bargaining
arrangements.
This problem has been exemplified, once again, by the Rwandan
experience. As I discussed earlier, the Rwandan government adopted a
specialized plea bargaining system to deal with the enormous volume of
cases related to the Rwandan genocide. The ICTR's repeatedly taking
jurisdiction over the leadership-level suspects has posed an obstacle to the
political acceptability within Rwanda of the plea-bargaining system, and
has led to conflict and acrimony between the government of Rwanda and
the ICTR.
These difficulties that have arisen in the ICTR's exercise of
concurrent jurisdiction with Rwandan national courts should alert us to
potential problems that may confront a permanent International Criminal
Court. The Rome Treaty establishing an ICC creates the framework for a
permanent international institution whose jurisdiction over the most serious
international crimes will, by the terms of the Treaty, be "complementary"
with that of national courts.
The Rome Treaty's complementarity framework provides, in essence,
that cases will be "admissible" before the ICC only where national justice
systems are unable or unwilling genuinely to prosecute the cases in
question. ICC complementarity incorporates a vestigial form of the
primacy of jurisdiction exercised by the ICTR in the sense that, under the
ICC Statute, it is the ICC that is to determine whether a case otherwise
coming within its jurisdiction is "admissible."
If admissibility is challenged, the ICC will make the final admissibility
determination. Thus, the ICC has the power to exercise jurisdiction where
the admissibility criteria are met, even over the objection of a State that
would otherwise have jurisdiction. ICC jurisdiction over an admissible
case will be exclusive, precluding national prosecution of the case, under
the Statute's ne bis in idem provisions. In the sense that it can assert
exclusive jurisdiction, even over the objection of a State, ICC
complementarity incorporates a revised form of primacy.
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The ICC may thus decide, even over the objection of a State that
would otherwise have jurisdiction, to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over a
given case. The ICC's taking of jurisdiction over one prosecution would
not, however, preclude the State's prosecution of other cases arising from
the same context of mass crimes. Where a State decides to do so,
concurrent jurisdiction with the ICC will be actively exercised. Where
active concurrent jurisdiction is exercised, the problems of anomalies of
inversion and impediments to plea bargaining will predictably arise, as they
have in Rwanda, if the international "forum pursues a policy of stratified
concurrent jurisdiction.
For the complementarity principle of the ICC Statute to be
meaningful, the ICC's operations must foster as much as possible (and
impede as little as possible) bona fide efforts to achieve justice at the
national level. Consistent with that premise, the appropriate response of
the ICC to the potential problems arising in the context of active concurrent
jurisdiction will depend, in part, upon why, in a given instance, State
courts are actively operating concurrently with the ICC. If the State's
justice efforts are bona fide and legitimate, then the ICC should take care
to operate in a manner that is indeed complementary to those national
efforts. If, on the other hand, the State's exercise of jurisdiction is not
bona fide, then complementarity may require non-cooperation with the
national jurisdiction.
A State might pursue cases arising from the same situation with which
the ICC is occupied for a number of different reasons. First, a State might
exercise active concurrent jurisdiction because, while it has a functioning
judiciary, it is unable to handle the particular cases being brought before
the ICC because the State cannot obtain extradition of those defendants or
cannot obtain necessary evidence abroad for those cases.
In this case, avoiding anomalies of inversion or impediments to plea
bargaining should present little problem. The ICC, consistent with its role
as a complement to national jurisdictions and thus acting only where States
are unwilling or unable to act, would pursue only those cases that the State
cannot.
In practice, this may result in the ICC disproportionately
prosecuting leaders (because those are the individuals likely to have had the
resources to flee the country and the political connections to block
intergovernmental cooperation). Nevertheless, the "leader-drain" effect is
likely to be far less pronounced than it would be under a deliberate policy
of stratified concurrent jurisdiction. Therefore, the problems of anomalies
of inversion and impediments to plea bargaining will be reduced if not
eliminated.
The second reason for active concurrent jurisdiction would be that,
while the ICC considers the State unable to prosecute because of a
collapsed justice system, the government's constituencies, including victim
populations, view the number or character of the prosecutions being
brought by the ICC as inadequate, and the State therefore views it as
worthwhile to proceed with prosecutions notwithstanding the impaired
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condition of its justice system. Here, it may be fruitful for the ICC
Prosecutor to negotiate with the national government to agree upon an ICC
prosecutorial strategy, regarding the number and character of ICC cases,
that would both satisfy the ICC's goals and adequately fulfill the justice
interests of the national population, thus obviating the need for national
trials. The existence and results of such a negotiation could be made public
so that the State government's relevant constituencies would be aware of
their government's role in securing the desirable prosecutorial approach.
Such negotiations would not constitute improper influence on the
Prosecutor or Court. While an overall approach as to the volume and
character of cases would be agreed upon, the agreement need not involve
commitments to prosecute particular defendants and, obviously, would not
influence the outcome of the cases brought.
The situation is more complex where the third reason for active
concurrent jurisdiction applies. Here, a State actively exercises jurisdiction
concurrently with the ICC because, while the ICC considers the State
unable to prosecute because of a collapsed justice system, the government
desires to consolidate the rule of law or reinforce the authority of the
national judiciary and therefore, on balance, views it as worthwhile to
proceed notwithstanding the impaired condition of its justice system. In
this situation, the State is interested not only in assuring a certain range of
prosecutions, but also, specifically, in conducting some or all of those
prosecutions in its national courts in order to reap national benefits.
Where the national justice system is completely collapsed and there
clearly is no hope of any national prosecutions of acceptable quality
occurring within an acceptable period, the ICC Prosecutor should attempt
to convince the State to forego national trials. But, the completely
collapsed justice system is the worst case scenario. Not all countries with
substantially collapsed justice systems will be completely incapable of
conducting absolutely any satisfactory trials. Where a largely disabled
justice system is capable of conducting one or two or a handful of adequate
prosecutions (perhaps with substantial international assistance), and that
State desires to pursue justice at the national level for rule of lawstrengthening and nation-building purposes, it may be possible to
accommodate both national and international interests. Here, a useful
strategy may be to reverse the traditionally-envisioned order of things and
have the national courts conduct a very small number of high-profile
prosecutions of prominent defendants while the international court conducts
a somewhat larger number of other prosecutions.
A different strategy may be necessary where the fourth reason for
active concurrent jurisdiction applies. Where a State is actively exercising
jurisdiction concurrently with the ICC because State actors seek through
national prosecutions to suppress, discredit or wreak vengeance upon
political adversaries, the ICC Prosecutor may wish to negotiate with the
national government regarding an ICC prosecutorial strategy that would
fulfill legitimate national justice interests sufficient to obviate any real need
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for national trials. Obviously, where political suppression is the State's
motive, it is less than likely (though not impossible, given states' needs to
maintain acceptable international appearances) that such an agreement
could be reached.
In all cases where negotiations fail to forestall national prosecutions,
the ICC's subsequent relations with the national jurisdiction should depend
upon the quality of the national prosecutorial efforts as they are actually
carried out. If national prosecutions are conducted with impartiality and
something approaching adequate due process, then the ICC should attempt
to foster those national justice proceedings. Such measures to foster
national justice efforts should include the ICC Prosecutor's taking into
account potential anomalies of inversion and impediments to plea
bargaining when designing criteria governing the defendants over which
the ICC will exercise jurisdiction. This will often require the ICC
Prosecutor to pursue a prosecutorial policy other than stratified concurrent
jurisdiction. If, on the other hand, national justice processes seriously lack
impartiality or adequate due process, then the ICC may have to refuse to
foster or cooperate with those national proceedings.
Evaluation of national justice processes to determine whether they
should be fostered would, of course, be an exceedingly sensitive matter.
Indeed, this necessarily is the case with a number of similar determinations
that the ICC must make. For instance, under the Statute, the Court will
make -determinations of whether States are "unwilling or unable genuinely
to [prosecute];" and of whether national prosecutions are undertaken "for
the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility
." and of whether national proceedings were not "conducted
independently or impartially .... " The need for the ICC to make such

sensitive determinations is an inherent feature of the overall
complementarity structure.
ICC complementarity thus raises some of its most sensitive and
complex issues when the ICC operates concurrently with active national
fora. Based on an extrapolation from the Rwandan experience, it is clear
that the ICC will have to employ a carefully constructed range of policy
responses in exercising active concurrent jurisdiction if it is to foster justice
both directly within the ICC and within the national fora with which it
interacts.
Let me add, before closing, that the potential difficulties of ICC
complementarity that arise when concurrent jurisdiction is actively
exercised are only half the problem. The other half will arise, as you may
have guessed, when concurrent jurisdiction is not actively exercised.
When the ICC is the sole active jurisdiction, there are significant risks that,
for structural reasons, the ICC will fail to address the distinct interests of
the nations most affected and, particularly, the victim populations. That
discussion, however, will have to be taken up on another day.

